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TAXATION - FEDERAL INCOME TAX- STATUS OF STocK-FoR-STocK Ex-
CHANGE WHERE BooT Is INVOLVED-Taxpayer was the sole stockholder of 
International Dairy Supply Company. In 1952, Foremost Dairies, Inc. 
acquired from taxpayer all his stock in Supply Company in exchange for 
82,375 shares of Foremast's common stock and 3,000,000 dollars cash. 
Taxpayer reported as gain from the transaction only the 3,000,000 dollars 
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"boot" received, less allowable expenses. The Commissioner determined 
a deficiency of 278,823 dollars, asserting that the nonrecognition provision 
of the 1939 Code counterpart of section 356 (a) (I) was inapplicable and 
therefore taxpayer's entire gain realized on the disposition must be recog-
nized. The Tax Court upheld taxpayer's contention that by virtue of 
section 356 (a) (1), which provides that if the exchange would otherwise 
have been within the scope of section 354 (a) (!)-providing that no gain 
or loss shall be recognized in a stock-for-stock reorganization exchange-
but for the receipt of "boot," the transaction is taxable only to the 
extent of the cash received.1 On appeal, held, reversed. The applica-
bility of section 354 (a) (I) in this case is predicated upon two "solely-for-
stock" requirements. First, this transaction must meet the definitional 
"solely-for-stock" requirement of section 368 (a) (I) (B)2 to receive the 
status of a "reorganization." Second, if the transaction is in fact a "re-
organization," section 354 provides nonrecognition of gain if the exchange 
of stock is made "solely-for-stock." If section 354 "would apply to an 
exchange but for"3 the failure to meet the "solely-for-stock" test of that 
section, the operative saving provision of section 356-which limits the 
tax to the gain not in excess of the boot-will apply. However, since this 
transaction does not, in the first instance, meet the definitional "solely-
for-stock" requirement of section 368, section 354 can never apply. There-
fore, section 356 is likewise not available to the taxpayer and he must 
recognize his entire gain. Commissioner v. Turnbow, 286 F.2d 669 (9th 
Cir. 1960), cert. granted, 366 U.S. 923 (1961) (No. 60). 
Only those transactions defined in section 368 (a) (I) are cognizable as 
"reorganizations" for tax purposes. It is important to note that only in the 
(B)-"stock-for-stock," and the comparable (C)-"stock-for-assets"4 defini-
1 Grover D. Turnbow, 32 T.C. 646 (1959), nonacq. 1960-CuM. BULL. 7. Taxpayer 
argued that "but for" the boot involved, the exchange would have been within 
§ 112 (b) (3) [§ 354 (a)(l)] which provides: "No gain or loss shall be recognized if 
stock or securities in a corporation a party to a reorganization are • . . exchanged solely 
for stock or securities in such corporation or in another corporation a party to the 
reorganization." Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 2, § 112 (b) (3), 53 Stat. 38 [now INT. R.Ev. 
CODE OF 1954, § 354 (a) (1) ]. Thus, he contended, it is taxable under § 112 (c) (1) 
[§ 356 (a) (1) ] only to the extent of the boot received. "If an exchange would be within 
the provisions of subsection (b) • • • (3) ••• of this section if it were not for the fact 
that the property ••• consists not only of property permitted by such paragraph to be 
received without the recognition of gain, but also of other property or money, then 
the gain . • . if any, to the recipient shall be recognized, but in an amount not in 
excess of the sum of such money and the fair market value of such other property." 
Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 2, § 112 (c) (1), 53 Stat. 39 [now INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, 
§ 356 (a) (1) ]. 
2 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 2, § 112 (g) (1) (B) , 53 Stat. 40 [now INT. REv. CoDE OF 
1954, § 368 (a) (1) (B) ], defines a "reorganization" as: "the acquisition by one corpora-
tion, in exchange solely for all or a part of its voting stock, of at least 80 per centum of 
the ••• stock of another corporation .••. " 
3 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 356 (a) (1) {A) • 
4 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 112 (g) (1) (C), as amended, ch. 247, § 213 (b), 53 Stat. 
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tions of reorganizations is there the "solely-for-stock" requirement. It is 
in these cases alone that the question arises whether an exchange involving 
boot may qualify as a reorganization. As early as 1941 the Supreme Court, 
in Helvering v. Southwest Consolidated Corp.,5 held that boot disqualified 
an attempted (C)-type reorganization. In that case all assets of an in-
solvent corporation were acquired for voting common stock, stock pur-
chase warrants, and cash of the newly-formed acquiring corporation. 
The Court held the transaction did not qualify for the preferred tax status 
afforded a reorganization because it fell short of the literal definition of a 
reorganization in subparagraph (C) in that the assets of the transferor 
corporation were not acquired solely £or voting stock.6 For almost twenty 
years, the generally accepted view-based on the Southwest decision-was 
that a transaction also would not qualify as a (B)-type reorganization if 
part of the consideration for the exchange were cash or "other property" 
since the definitional provisions in both subparagraphs (B) and (C) con-
tain the identical "solely-for-stock" requirement. However, in 1956 the 
Seventh Circuit in Howard v. Commissioner,7 seemingly ignored the thrust 
of the Southwest decision and held that an exchange of stock-for-stock-plus-
boot did qualify for preferred tax treatment under the savings clause of 
section 356 (a) (1)-the so-called "but for" provision. The decision, in 
effect, was that the saving provision of that section applied not only to 
the operative section 354 (a) (1) "solely-for-stock" requirement, but also to 
the independent, definitional section 368 (a) (I) (B) "solely-for-stock" re-
quirement. The court reasoned that "but for" the cash boot distributed, 
the "solely-for-stock" requirement of the definitional provision in section 
368 (a) (I) (B) would have been met, thus qualifying the transaction as a 
reorganization. Section 356 (a) (I) would then come into operation, pre-
venting the entire transaction from being disqualified for the preferential 
nonrecognition treatment and requiring the recognition of gain only to 
the extent of the boot received. The court in the principal case limited 
the operation of section 356 (a) (I) to the "solely-for-stock" requirement of 
section 354 (a) (1). Now the question is again raised, and the Supreme 
Court will have the opportunity to reconsider and to re-evaluate its deci-
sion in the Southwest case. 
To determine whether the interpretation in Howard or that given by 
the court in the principal case most clearly reflects the congressional pur-
pose behind the provisions, the policy for allowing nonrecognition in 
870 [now INT. REv. ConE OF 1954, § 368 (a) (1) (C) ], defines a "reorganization" as: "the 
acquisition by one corporation, in exchange solely for all or a part of its voting 
stock, ... of substantially all the properties of another corporation ••.. " 
5 315 U.S. 194 (1942). 
6 The Court stated: " 'Solely' leaves no leeway. Voting stock plus some other 
consideration does not meet the statutory requirement." Id. at 198. 
7 238 F.2d 943 (7th Cir. 1956). 
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reorganizations must be considered. It has been said that the primary 
concern is that business adjustments necessary to the economic health of 
the country would be discouraged if recognition of gains were required 
each time a substantial change was made in the form of a business struc-
ture.8 To the end of facilitating business adjustments, Congress provided 
in the Revenue Act of 19189 that gain or loss realized in a "reorganization, 
merger, or consolidation" would not be recognized for tax purposes at the 
time of the transaction. Due to the vagueness of the above terms, it is 
doubtful whether business adjustments were really facilitated. It was not 
until the Revenue Act of 193410 that the provisions governing nonrecog-
nition in reorganizations were solidified into what is substantially their 
present form. At that time, the preferred tax treatment was limited to the 
specific types of reorganizations defined in the statute. "Statutory" mergers 
or consolidations were defined, in subparagraph (A) of that forerunner of 
section 368 (a) (1), to be reorganizations. Because statutory mergers or con-
solidations were unavailable in some states, Congress provided that "stock.-
for-stock" and "stock-for-assets" exchanges would likewise be considered 
reorganizations under what are now subparagraphs (B) and (C).11 It has 
been argued that this congressional intent will be thwarted by the inter-
pretation adopted by the court in the principal case, since a small minority 
of dissident stockholders could always prevent an exchange from qualify-
ing as a non-taxable reorganization.12 This, however, is not correct. Con-
gress has provided in the definitional provision itself that to effect a (B) 
reorganization only 80 percent13 of the stock of the corporation need be 
8 See the now famous "Gregg Statement," N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 1924, p. 1, col. 2 
(Gregg was a special assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury); H. R. REP. No. 704, 
73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1934); cf. Barker v. United States, 200 F.2d 223 (9th Cir. 1952). 
For a discussion rejecting this as a grounds for the grant of preferred tax status, see 
Hellerstein, Mergers, Taxes, and Realism, 71 HARV. L. REv. 254 (1957) • Other supporting 
considerations are that generally, in a reorganization, there has not been a sufficiently 
final change in form to tax the exchange. See Gregg, op. cit. supra, p. l; see generally 
Sandberg, The Income Tax Subsidy to "Reorganizations," 38 CoLUM. L. REv. 98 (1938). 
Also, where a taxpayer has received little or no money through an exchange, collection 
of a tax on the entire amount of the gain would be inequitable since the ta.xpayer 
would not be in position to pay. H. R. REP. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1924), 
S. REP. No. 398, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 17-18 (1924). It is doubtful, however, whether this 
is the rationale underlying the preferred treatment given reorganizations since the 
taxation of boot is not restricted to cash received but includes, under § 356 (a) (1), 
"other property." See Sandberg, supra at 100. 
o Ch. 18, § 202 (b) , 40 Stat. 1060. 
10 Ch. 277, § 112 (g) (I) (B) , 48 Stat. 705. 
11 See S. REP. No. 558, 73d Cong. 2d Sess. 16-17 (1934), which states, in part: "Not 
all the states have adopted statutes providing for mergers or consolidations. • . • The 
committee believes it is desirable to permit reorganizations in such cases. . . • The 
committee believes that these transactions • . . are in themselves sufficiently similar to 
mergers and consolidations as to be entitled to similar treatment." • 
12 See, e.g., Howard v. Commissioner, 238 F.2d 943, 947 (7th Cir. 1956); Fahey, 
Income Tax Definition of "Reorganization," 39 CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 933, 948 (1939) . 
13 The requirement of § 112 (g) (1) (B) of the 1939 Code was acquisition of 80% 
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acquired.14 It is thus seen that there need be no cash or "other property" 
exchanged in order to effect the reorganization. However, in an (A) re-
organization (merger or consolidation) there is a need to permit a certain 
amount of boot to be exchanged because in at least thirty-three states 
"appraisal statutes" have been enacted under which stockholders who 
dissent from the plan of merger or consolidation are given the right to 
demand payment for the fair value of their shares.11> Many "appraisal 
statutes" also specifically give stockholders the right to payment for their 
shares in case of an exchange of all the assets of the corporation-a (C)-
type reorganization.16 However, whether a state's "appraisal statute" 
includes such a provision or not, it is quite likely the transferor corpora-
tion, upon the exchange of substantially all its assets, will be dissolved, in 
which event the dissenting stockholders will be entitled to receive the fair 
value of their shares under the general provisions of such statutes.17 There-
of the stock of the other corporation. Under the 1954 Code § 368 (a) (1) (B), the 
acquiring corporation must be in "control" of the other corporation immediately after 
the exchange. "Control" is defined as ownership of 80% of the stock of a corporation. 
INT. R.Ev. ConE OF 19~4, § 368 (c). Although the court in the principal case rejected 
the Howard rationale, it is possible to distinguish that case on its facts. In Howard, 
80.19% of the stock of a corporation was acquired solely for stock. Had no more stock 
been acquired, the transaction would have qualified under § 112 (g) (1) (B) [§ 368 (a) 
(1) (B) ] as a reorganization. It would thus have been entitled to tax free treatment 
under § 112 (b) (3) [§ 354 (a) (1) ] , "but for" the remaining stock which was acquired 
for cash. Since § 112 (b) (3) would apply "but for" the boot distributed, § 112 (c) (1) was 
held to operate thus preserving the transaction's reorganization status. In the principal 
case only 29% of the stock of Supply was acquired "solely-for-stock" of Foremost. Thus, 
"but for" the cash involved, Foremost still would not have acquired 80% of the stock 
of Supply solely for its own stock and so, it may be argued, the exchange could never 
qualify as a reorganization. 
14 Even where the dissenters hold more than 20% in interest, a reorganization could 
be consummated if their shares were acquired for cash in a separate and independent 
transaction. However, the possibility would remain that the Commissioner might 
determine there had been only one transaction with two phases. See, e.g., Halliburton v. 
Commissioner, 78 F.2d 265 (9th Cir. 1935) • For a discussion of the problems which may 
arise in such exchanges under the 1939 Code and the 1954 Code, see Greene, Proposed 
Definitional Changes in Reorganizations, 14 TAX L. R.Ev. 155, 160 &: n.34 (1959). 
15 See BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 298 (rev. ed. 1946) ; Lattin, Remedies of 
Dissenting Stockholders Under Appraisal Statutes, 45 HARV. L. R.Ev. 233, 237 (1931). 
16 See BALLANTINE, op. cit. supra note 15, § 298; Lattin, supra note 15, at 248; cf. 
Ballantine & Sterling, Upsetting Mergers and Consolidations: Alternative Remedies of 
Dissenting Shareholders in California, 27 CALIF. L. R.Ev. 644, 672 (1939) suggesting, under 
some statutes (similar to California's) , that dissenting stockholders may have this right 
even where the general corporation statute did not specifically confer the power to 
exchange all the corporation's assets for stock of another corporation over objection of 
dissenting stockholders. 
17 See note 15 supra. The transferor corporation ordinarily will be dissolved since 
if it is not, it will be subject to a tax on 15% of the dividends received from the 
acquiring corporation under § 243. Congress recognized the legal necessity to "buy off" 
dissenting stockholders and provided for it in the 1954 Code under § 368 (a) (2) (B) • 
The House version of this provision, H.R. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. § 359 (c) (1954), 
would have required the liquidation of the transferor corporation and provided also that 
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fore, in both (A) and (C) reorganizations the requirement of cash payment 
to dissenting shareholders will often make the distribution of boot a 
practical necessity. However, there is no such justification for permitting 
it in (B) reorganizations since there is no legal compulsion to "buy off'' 
dissident stockholders.18 Another criticism leveled at the interpretation 
of the court in the principal case rests on possible effects under section 
356 (c) of the 1954 Code. That section provides for nonrecognition of 
losses resulting from transactions that would qualify under section 
354 (a) (1) "but for" the receipt of additional property not permitted under 
that section. If the existence of boot in an exchange prevents the exchange 
from being a reorganization so that section 356 (a) (1) does not apply and 
the entire amount of the gain must be recognized, then if there were a 
loss, section 356 (c) likewise would not apply and the entire loss could be 
recognized. Thus if only a small amount of cash or "other property" is 
received, the transaction will constitute a sale and taxpayer may recognize 
his entire loss.19 There is no answer to this objection. However, whether 
the provisions will be subject to abuse may depend on the courts' willing-
ness to extend the rationale of Higgins v. Smith.20 In that case a loss 
claimed on the "sale" of marketable securities to a wholly-owned corpora-
tion was disallowed on the ground that the time and manner of taxation 
established by Congress could not be circumvented merely by the form in 
which a transaction was carried out if, in substance, no loss had been 
sustained.21 
In addition to the practical considerations discussed above, the stat-
utory history of the (C) reorganization provision supports the result 
reached in the principal case. Prior to the enactment of the 1954 Code, 
the assets of the transferor corporation had to be acquired "solely-for-
stock."22 New section 368 (a) (2) (B) of the 1954 Code was adopted solely 
to modify this by providing that a stock-for-assets-plus-boot exchange may 
still qualify as a (C) reorganization so long as 80 percent of the property 
if 80% of the transferor corporation's assets were acquired "solely-for-stock," the 
remainder could be acquired for cash. The Senate modified this by deleting the 
requirement that the transferor corporation be dissolved. See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d 
Cong., 2d Sess. 274 (1954) • However, if the transferor corporation is not dissolved, and 
if dividends are not paid, the threat of the penalty tax of § 531 is imminent. 
18 But see Ayers &: Repetti, Boot Distributions Under the '54 Tax Code, 32 Nonm 
DAME LAW. 414, 419 (1957), suggesting there is no sound reason for prohibiting boot 
in a (B) reorganization and that the court in Howard reached an "equitable result." 
10 The actual amount of loss deduction would be limited by § 1211 (b). However, 
the "loss" could still be used to immunize any gains which the taxpayer might have 
realized during the year. 
20 308 U.S. 473 (1940). 
21 C/. Burnet v. Commonwealth Improvement Co., 287 U.S. 415 (1932) (gain on 
sale by corporation to sole stockholder recognized) . 
22 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § ll2 (g) (1) (B) • 
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acquired is acquired "solely-for-stock."23 The Howard interpretation 
would permit a stock-for-stock-plus-boot and, presumably, a stock-for-assets-
plus-boot exchange to qualify in the absence of the new section 368-
(a) (2) (B), and thus would render that provision superfluous. 
Roger B. Harris, S.Ed. 
23 See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1954) . 
